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APOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT 
PROBLEM REPORTING AND CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM 
B y T .  J. Adams 
Lyndon B.  Johnson Space Center  
SUMMARY 
The Apollo spacecraft Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System was de- 
signed to ensure that rapid identification and reporting were accomplished and that vig- 
orous analysis and disposition of problems were made before flight. To accomplish 
this goal, various techniques were used and refinements made during the program, re- 
sulting in the present closed-loop approach. Every problem was carefully analyzed, 
and recurrence control was  initiated to ensure early maturity of the hardware. A large 
number of open problems existed in the 1965-1966 time frame,  and many means were 
used by the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (formerly the Manned Spacecraft 
Center) and the contractors to resolve these problems. The fact that these problems 
were resolved and closed in a relatively short period of t ime is a credit to all concerned. 
Features  of the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System used in the Apollo 
Program a r e  applicable to future manned spacecraft, but ca re  should be exercised to 
adapt the system to the requirements of the new applications. 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem reporting and disposition were of significant importance in achieving 
maturity of the Apollo spacecraft hardware. Recognition of this importance w a s  inade- 
quate in the early phases of the program, resulting in  the need for many refinements. 
The present Apollo Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System (PRACAS) is dis- 
cussed and background presented on deficiencies that existed in the early systems and 
the methods used to cor rec t  these deficiencies. 
Early in the Apollo Program, the following ground rules were established. 
1. No flight shall be launched with unresolved or  unexplained problems. 
2. Al l  problems must be analyzed to establish the cause so that corrective action 
can be taken o r  the r i sk  of not taking action can be explained. 
3. The closeout criteria must include a documented correction (that is, drawing 
changes, specifications, procedures, processes, and so forth) that is applicable to 
either the hardware, software, o r  both. 
The present system was designed using these ground rules and has the following 
requirements. 
1. All problems occurring from acceptance tes t s  through flight missions must 
be reported. Problems occurring before acceptance tests must also be reported, but 
formal management review and closeout are unnecessary unless the problem is con- 
sidered critical from a schedule and cost standpoint. 
2. An analysis of the problem is to be made by knowledgeable, design-cognizant 
individuals to ascertain the cause of the problem and to devise an acceptable corrective 
and preventive action. 
3. The analysis and the corrective action taken for  each problem a r e  to be tech- 
nically reviewed and verified independently by Reliability and Management personnel 
within the contractor organization. The purpose of this review is to confirm adequate 
technical actions and recurrence control to meet program schedules on all "like" 
hardware. 
4. An independent review is made by Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance 
(SR&QA) and Management personnel of the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
(formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)) to ascertain the technical adequacy of 
the contractors' problem closeouts and also the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
PRACAS itself. 
5. Continuously updated management visibility of the status of all open problems 
is provided. 
6. The contractors are required to report  critical problems promptly to NASA. 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT SYSTEM DESCRI PTION 
In the early stages of the Apollo Program, contractors and suppliers used their 
existing corporate procedures fo r  problem reporting, analysis, and corrective action. 
The system primarily used led to the use of an electronic data processing (EDP) sys- 
tem as noted in figure 1. The pr imary feature of the early system was reporting the 
status of failures with the use  of the EDP system. The contractors entered the failure 
on computer tapes and updated the tapes at regular intervals until the problem was re- 
solved. All spacecraft and ground support equipment (GSE) failures were required to 
be entered. Individual failures were required to be closed within 30 to 45 days after 
occurrence. Copies of the tapes were provided to NASA, and weekly printouts were 
made and distributed to cognizant MSC personnel. Appropriate NASA personnel re- 
viewed the tape printouts and provided concurrence o r  nonconcurrence with the con- 
tractor 's  proposed closeout. Copies of the tape printout containing the NASA comments 
were provided the contractor for his information o r  action. Printout summaries of the 
tapes were provided periodically to NASA management. It was never possible to obtain 
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Figure 1. - Early Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System. 
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current information utilizing the tapes. The NASA technical personnel were able to 
maintain current information by working with their  contractor counterparts. 
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Critical failures were reported to NASA within 24 hours of occurrence. Critical 
failures were defined as those occurring during qualification/certification test and those 
impacting schedules, cost, o r  launch (program impact failures). 
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This system existed from the beginning of the program without significant change 
until 1966 when two changes were made. First, the requirement for reporting all GSE 
failures to NASA was changed to reporting only those failures of GSE used in countdown 
and of other GSE that had a safety o r  spacecraft impact. This change was made because 
of the large number of GSE failures and the need to emphasize those failures requiring 
recurrence control. This requirement, however, did not relieve the contractor of the 
responsibility for continuing to analyze and close all GSE failures. Second, the con- 
t ractors  prepared an Apollo Problem Summary (APS) of each problem for u se  a t  the 
Flight Readiness Review (FRR). The problem summaries served two purposes: 
(1) they summarized major program impact problems for the FRR board, and (2) they 
explained problems that would not be corrected before flight. 
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It became apparent in late 1966 and early 1967 that several  deficiencies existed 
in  the system that required correction. Centralization of the contractors' failure re- 
porting and corrective action system w a s  needed. Failures were not accumulated at or 
managed f rom a central location. This resulted in the loss  of reported failures; inade- 
quate awareness of the status of problems by contractor and NASA management; 
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inadequate support of failure closeouts to meet program milestones; and poor use  of 
available resources. In addition, with various Apollo spacecraft being fabricated during 
this t ime frame, i t  w a s  mandatory to have better control of the effectiveness of changes 
resulting from failure closeout. A s  a result, centralized problem assessment  a r e a s  
were established. All failures were reported to these a reas .  Representatives from 
all disciplines concerned with failure closeout were assigned to these areas. Time 
lines were established for each failure to show vehicle and GSE closeout effectivity to 
support vehicle milestones. These time lines were displayed to provide management 
awareness. 
Many problems that existed were significant but did not fall within the definition 
of a failure and therefore were not reported or  tracked within the overall system. Such 
i tems  as dented tanks, contamination, and so forth, were included in this category and 
were considered unsatisfactory conditions rather  than failures. These types of prob- 
lems  were handled by the contractors' internal system but they were not reported to 
NASA even though they were significant. Accordingly, the name and content of the 
Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System was changed to Problem Reporting and 
Corrective Action System to encompass both failures and unsatisfactory conditions. 
(The PRACAS nomenclature is defined in the appendix. ) 
The Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (RASPO) at each pr ime contractor 
plant w a s  the pr ime interface with the contractor for problem closeouts. These res i -  
dent personnel were located in the contractor problem assessment  a r e a s  and were re- 
quired to concur in all problem closeouts. This permitted a more timely review of 
contractor activities and a more timely NASA concurrence of closeouts. Coordination 
was accomplished with MSC on all problems. 
To improve reporting of problems from the pr ime contractor suppliers, quality 
assurance (QA) delegations'to Government agencies in residence at the supplier plants 
were amended to require reporting of significant problems to MSC. This provided a 
check on the adequacy of supplier reporting to the pr ime contractor, although, in some 
cases, the response from the Government agency was inadequate. 
In late 1967, after repeated attempts to streamline the EDP system to make it 
more timely, the contractors finally abandoned it as a real-time system and began re -  
porting all problems to MSC by datafax through the local RASPO. The open problem 
list  (OPL) was instituted by MSC, at f i rs t  manually and then by automated printout, to 
t rack open problems. The MSC RASPO was required to approve all contractor problem 
closeouts. The EDP system was  still used, but only as a data bank for the history of 
problems. Personnel at the launch site were required to report  problems in real time 
to the prime contractor. In addition, launch site personnel were given copies of the 
problem closeout packages on problems reported from the launch site and copies of the 
OPL. A t  this time, the Apollo Configuration Change Board began to review chronic 
open problems to provide management incentive for closeout. A procedure entitled 
"Explained Problems'' was added to the system and w a s  presented to the FRR board 
before each mission. These problems were understood but were not closed. However, 
the failure mode and its effect were understood and sufficient information was  developed 
to justify the r i sk ,  i f  any. 
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With these improvements, PRACAS stabilized. The contractor portion of the 
system is shown in figure 2(a) and the internal MSC interfaces in figure 2(b). The sys-  
tem is summarized in the following sections. 
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Figure 2. - Present  Problem Reporting 
and Corrective Action System. 
Repor t ing of S ign i f i can t  Problems 
The contractors were required to re- 
port, within 24 hours of occurrence o r  de- 
tection, all problems that occurred during 
o r  after acceptance testing that could ad- 
versely affect safety, contribute to schedule 
delay, o r  result in design change; also all 
problems that occurred during certification 
testing or  while setting up equipment for 
acceptance tests. If recurrence of the prob- 
lem on like hardware had safety implications, 
the hardware supplier w a s  required to pro- 
vide recommendations for usage restrictions 
until problem analysis and resolution were 
complete. Also, the hardware supplier was 
required to forward to MSC problem reports  
5 
received from subtier hardware suppliers within 24 hours of receipt. The report  con- 
tained, at a minimum, the data shown in figure 3. Within 1 calendar week of occur- 
rence o r  detection, the additional data shown in the second column of figure 3 were 
reported to MSC. 
Repor t ing of Rou t ine  Problems 
The contractors were required to report, within 1 calendar week of occurrence o r  
detection, routine problems that occurred during o r  after acceptance testing that would 
not adversely affect the program. The minimum data reported a r e  shown in figure 3; a 
sample of one format used is shown in figure 4. Reporting continued fo r  the operational 
life of the equipment. 
Storage and Retr ieval Fi le 
A permanent storage and retrieval file of problems was  maintained by MSC based 
on EDP tapes submitted by the contractors. This file was used for various types of en- 
gineering investigations based on problem history. 
I mmediate Not i f icat ion 
Incoming problem reports were reviewed by MSC to  determine which ones should 
be brought to the immediate attention of program management. A "Problem Notifica- 
tion" form, shown in figure 5, was completed f o r  each problem thus categorized. 
lem notifications were categorized into one of three groupings: "STD" (standard) for 
those to be distributed to technical personnel such as subsystem managers and technical 
monitors but not to program management, "Management" for  those that required dis- 
tribution to MSC program management and subsystem managers and technical monitors, 
and "Flash" for those recommended for forwarding by MSC program management to 
NASA Headquarters. 
"Management. I '  Each notification was marked "N" fo r  "noncritical" o r  "Prr for 
?'program. '( 
Prob- 
The same distribution was made fo r  "Flash" notifications as for 
Rout ine  Not i f icat ion and Problem Sta tus  
A central point at MSC managed all problem data. Distribution of data, including 
copies of problem reports and resolution information, was made by this central point. 
The hardware supplier sent to MSC all reportable problems, including those fo r  which 
a 24-hour report had been submitted. Real-time displays of open problem data affecting 
the next scheduled manned spacecraft launch were maintained by the central point for  
use by the program manager. The hardware supplier periodically submitted to MSC a 
listing of all open problems. Periodic listings of open problems were published and 
distributed by the central point. These listings provided problem status information 
and indicated the applicability of the problems to particular spacecraft. Commencing 
60 days before each manned spacecraft launch, a chart  was prepared by the central 
point showing the number of problems that were considered applicable to the vehicles 
or  supporting equipment f o r  that mission. The chart  was prepared weekly and updated 
daily after the Headquarters FRR and distributed to appropriate MSC program manage- 
ment. An example of the chart is shown in figure 6. 
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DATA ELEMENT MATRIX 
T h e  fol lowing matrix indicates elements of data that the hardware supplier shal l ,  as a ininlmum, 
report t o M S C f o r  each nonconformance. 
The hardware supplier s!laIl record, and retain 
for a time prescribed by contract, a l l  relevant 
data for each nonconformance. 
/ / / / / 
NO Y E S  YES YES YES Uniquely Identi f iable Report Number 
Date of nonconformance occurrence, or date 
nonconformance was detected i f  occurrence YES Y E S  YES YES YES 
date i s  iiidetermlnable 
. -- 
Indication of whether nonconformance is  
classif ied as fai lure or iinsatisfactory YES YES YES YES Y E S  
condition 
Part number on which nonconformance occurred YES Y E S  YES YES YES 
YES Y E S  YES YES YES Part name on which nonconformance occurred 
Serial number of part on which nonconformance YES YES YES YES YES 
occurred 
Manufacturer of part on which nonconformance NO YES YES YES YES 
occurred 
Symptom of nonconformance YES Y E S  YES YES YES 
Test  being performed at  time of occurrence YES YES YES YES YES 
Brief,  narrative description of nonconformance YES Y E S  YES YES YES 
End item on which nonconformance occurred, YES YES YES YES Y E S  
-~ 
- 
- ~ _ _ _ _  ~ 
~~~ 
~~ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ .  
___.___ 
YES YES YES YES YES Prevalent conditions at t ime of occurrence 
A l l  end items whlch may be affected by NO YES YES YES YES 
nonconformance 
Problem report numbers, and dates, that NO NO YES YES A A  
relate to the same problem 
_ _ _ _ ~ ~ _ _  -~ -______ 
Cri t ica l i ty  wi th  relat ionship to mission YES Y E S  YES YES YES 
effects (see Attachment C) 
Indication of whether nonconformance is  design I K  I K  YES Y E S  AA 
oriented or manufacturing oriented 
Analysis results, including laboratory test NO IK YES t AA 
results 
Cause of nonconformance IK IK YES t A A  
Corrective action NO I K  YES N/A AA 
Planned date of disposit ioning NO YES NO NO YES 
Explanation rat ionale N/A N/A NO YES NO 
Assurance that explanations using redundancy 
and/a alternate modes of operation as one of the NO NO NO YES NO 
elements do not neqate each other 
When last test of art icle, prior t o  mission, i s  to 
be perfamed. Statement as to whether or not non- NO NO NO YES NO 
conformance i s  detectable during mission 
Effect on mission i f  nonconformance recurred and N O  NO NO YES NO 
recommended owrat ional  workaround orocedures 
- 
Previous history of nonconforminq art icle NO NO YES Y E S  NO 
t 
A A  
N/A Not Applicable 
IK I f  Known 
Hardware supplier shal l  indicate any findings 
A s  Available, prior to resolution 
Figure 3. - Example of data element matrix form. 
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NASA - MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
FAILURE INVESTIGATION ACTION REPORT NO. 
1. PROJECT 2.  WHERE DETECTED 3. ORG. REPORT NO. 4 .  PROB. CLASSIF. 
F A C I L I T Y  O R G A N I Z A T I O N  L O C A T I O N  0 FAILURE 
R UNSAT. COND. 
5. D A T E  REPORTEI 
6. CONTRACTOR 7 .  END ITEM NAME 8. ITEM UNDER TEST 9. N E X T  ASSY. NAME 10. REPORTED ITEM 
11. TPS NUMBER 7a. E l  MODEL NO. Ba. CONTR. P A R T  NO. 9a. CONTR. P A R T  NO. 
22 CRITICALITY 
23 INITIATOR CONTACT ORG D A T E  24 RIE  ORG D A T E  
- 
25 HARDWARE ANALYSIS REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 
26 ASSIGNED TO ORG D A T E  27 REQUESTER ORG D A T E  
~ - __ 
28 CAUSE OF FAILURE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
loa. CONTR P A R T  NO. 
29. SYSTEM ENGINEER ORG. D A T E  30. RIE ORG. DATE 
31. CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUESTED 
12. ROUTING VIA 7b. E l  SERIAL NO. Bb. SUPPLIER P A R T  NO. 9b. SUPPLIER P A R T  NO. 
32. ACTION ASSIGNED TO ORG. DATE 33. REQUESTER ORG. D A T E  
34. CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN 
lob .  SUPPLIER PART NO. 
~ ~~~ 
35 ACTION BY ORG DATE 36 RIF ORG DATE p? CLOSE-OUT D A T E  
13. SPEC PROCESS NO BC.  SERIAL NO. 9c. SERIAL NO. 
D A T E  P A R A .  
I I 
ASC FORM 2174 (JUL  6 6 )  PAGE - OF - 
Figure 4. - Example of failure investigation action report. 
1Oc. SERIAL NO. 
8 
0 FAILURE 0 UNSAT COND. 0 UNDETERMINED 
PROBLEM NOTIFICATION 
SSM FLASH - STD. - MSC LOG NO. 
SSE MANAGEMENT REPORT NO. 
0 CSM 0 L M  0 G&C PAEASSESSMENT N P PAC CODE (NR) 
ORIGINATOR LOCATION PHONE 
NONCONFORMANCE SITE 
NONCONFORMANCEOCCURREDDURING 
DATEOFNONCONFORMANCE SUBSYSTEM 
.D A T  E/T IME R EC E IVED 
CONTRACTOR SUBCONTRACTOR 
PART NUMBER/SN 
S/C OCCURRED ON OR FIRST AFFECTED 
CRITICALITY 
PART NAME 
NEXT HIGHER ASSEMBLY TP NO. 
NONCONFORMANCE DESCR I PTlON 
~~ ~ 
SUSPECTED CAUSE 
DISTRIBUTION STANDARD, PLUS 
RECEIVED BY 
PROBLEM ASSESSMENT ENGINEERING 
Figure 5. - Example of problem notification report. 
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Problem Closeout 
The MSC was required to concur in all contractor problem closeouts. The prob- 
lem control sheet shown in figure 7 was used to record MSC acceptance of closeouts. 
Signatures were required by the cognizant MSC design engineer and the SR&QA engineer. 
The problem was closed o r  explained. 
lem control sheets. The OPL was updated to reflect the actions taken, such as complete 
removal of a problem if it was resolved for the entire program o r  indication of the 
spacecraft to which the resolution was applicable. 
Contractors were provided copies of the prob- 
Potential Hardware I mpact Problems 
Those problems that were considered to have a potential hardware impact were 
marked on the OPL with the letters "PHI. '' If known, the date the nonconformance was 
deemed to have a potential hardware impact was  also noted. When applicable, the end- 
i tems affected were indicated. 
Management Reviews 
A series of selected contractor and customer management reviews w a s  conducted 
at various levels of management throughout the program to discipline the system and 
accelerate problem closures. 
The Apollo hardware problem experience from program initiation to mid-1972 is 
shown in figure 8. More than 50 000 problems were experienced during the course of 
the Apollo Program. The slope of the cumulative problem curve is very sensitive to 
program activity. The peak in problems occurred in early 1967 (peak of certification 
test activity), and a gradual slowdown in activity occurred in early 1969 (completion of 
most of the certification test activity and subsystem deliveries). I 
An evaluation was made of various problem causes. The resul ts  are plotted in 
figure 8(b) for the Apollo spacecraft and in figure 8(c) for  the Apollo spacecraft ground 
support equipment. 
I 
From figure 8(b), it can be calculated that more than 18 percent of the Apollo 
spacecraft problems were from design causes; more than 35 percent were due to  
manufacturing/procedure causes; and approximately 20 percent were due to human er- 
ror. Similar calculations fo r  ground support equipment can be obtained from figure 8(c). 
Another significant item evident in figure 8(b) is that, although the majority of the 
spacecraft design and human e r r o r  problems occurred in 1966, the manufacturing/ 
the certification test program was completed and a trained checkout team was fully op- 
erational by 1967. However, even though manufacturing was significantly reduced during 
this period, a large amount of rework (because of design changes) added substantially to 
the manufacturing and testing level of effort. This may explain the higher incidence of 
manufacturing/procedre problems. The problems experienced from 1963 to 1972 for 
various Apollo hardware (command and service module (CSM), lunar module (LM), 
guidance and navigation (G&N), and Government furnished equipment (GFE)) are shown 
in f igures  9(a) to 9(g). The figures again emphasize peak problem activity in 1966. 
c procedure problems continued. This is explained, in part, because the major part of 
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Figure 7. - Example of problem control sheet. 
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Figure 8. - Apollo hardware cumulative Figure 9. - Apollo hardware problem 
problem experience. experience. 
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(e) The CSM ground support equipment. (g) Government furnished equipment. 
Figure 9. - Concluded. 
Subsystem breakdowns denoting where the problems were detected are shown in 
table I. These subsystems a r e  listed in order  by percentages of total spacecraft hard- 
ware failures found in each subsystem. The majority of the failures were in the elec- 
trical subsystems; the percentages found in screening tes t s  were especially high. 
Because of difficulties in obtaining components that would meet mission requirements, 
special attention was given to an electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) 
par ts  evaluation program. In the primary mechanical subsystem, the overall failure 
ra tes  and the percentages of screening test failures were relatively low, while the per- 
centages of problems found in certification testing were generally greater than the mean. 
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TABLE I. - SUBSYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION 
[Data a s  of September 19721 
Subsystem 
Instrumentation 
Environmental control 
Displays and controls 
Propulsion 
Reaction control 
Electrical power 
Communications 
Stabilization control 
Fuel cell and cryogenics 
Guidance and control 
Structures  and mechanics 
Earth landing and uprighting 
Crew equipment 
Ordnance 
Mean percent 
I 
- 
Subsystem failures breakdown, 
percent 
Total failures, 
percent 
1
15.9 
13.9 
12 .4  
10. 8 
10.4 
7.6 
7.4 
4.8 
4.7 
3.9 
2.8 
2 . 0  
1.8 
1.6 
Electrical assemblies  
Propulsion 
Instrumentation 
Environmental control 
Radar 
Reaction control 
Communications 
Abort guidance 
Stabilization control 
Electr ical  power 
Structures  and mechanics 
Crew equipment 
Mean percent 
18.6 
15.1 
12.5 
9.1 
7.6 
7.6 
6.9 
6.2 
5.7 
4.3 
4.1 
2.2 
CSM 
77. 3 
72. 5 
71.9 
72.4 
60. 2 
55. 7 
68.1 
77. 8 
66. 0 
61. 5 
36.2 
46.9 
34. 7 
46.0 
60.6 
LM 
74.0 
69.9 
59.0 
62.6 
76.4 
57.5 
77.2 
68.2 
66. 5 
37. 3 
32.9 
42. 5 
60. 3 
Vehicle 
Certification 
I test 1 Preflight 
3.9 
12.2 
10 .2  
19 .4  
15. 3 
24. 5 
1 8 . 9  
15 .1  
22.7 
16.4 
36. 0 
31.6 
5 1 . 2  
44.7 
22.9 
1 6 . 0  
11 .4  
13.8 
14. 3 
15. 4 
13.9 
16 .8  
16.1 
25. 3 
26.8 
24.4 
33.6 
19.0 
18.4 
13.9 
17 .2  
8.1 
24. 0 
18.8 
11.6 
5.9 
9 .7  
19 .5  
26. 5 
19.6 
12.1 
8.7 
15. 3 
9.5 
18.6 
26. 7 
22.7 
8.2 
27.5 
5.9 
15. 3 
7.7 
35. 3 
42. 5 
23. 3 
20. 3 
0.4 
1 . 4  
.7 
.1 
. 5  
1.0 
1 . 4  
1 .2  
1 . 6  
2.6 
1.3 
1.9 
2. 0 
. 6  
1 . 2  
0.5 
.1 
. 5  
. 4  
. o  
1.1 
.1 
. 4  
. 5  
. 6  
. 2  
. 6  
. 4  
a 
bIncludes postflight fa i lures  for  CSM only. 
Acceptance tes t  procedure/preinstallation tes t .  
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PERFORMANCE OF THE PROBLEM REPORTING 
AND CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM 
As can be seen in figure 9(a), the rate of problems occurring in the program rose 
very steeply in 1965 and 1966, peaking at 1800 p e r  month in late 1966. To handle this 
quantity, several means were used by NASA and the contractors to close the problems 
expeditiously. Handwritten duplicate logs of open problems were maintained a t  MSC and 
at the prime contractor plants to track the open problems. Daily telephone conferences 
were held between cognizant NASA and contractor engineering personnel to discuss open 
problems and develop means for closeouts. On critical problems, special teams of 
NASA and contractor personnel were established to work the problem in "real time. 
This involved, in some cases, hand-carrying the failed hardware to the vendor for  fail- 
u r e  analysis, witnessing the failure analysis, and expediting the paperwork for  problem 
closeout. A s  a result of these efforts and the corrective actions leading to hardware 
maturity, the number of problems dropped dramatically in late 1966. 
CONCLUD I NG REMARKS 
The Apollo Program was a very complex program undertaken by NASA. The size 
of the program dictated that a new approach was necessary to understand and correct  
problems. This was not initially recognized, and a se r i e s  of changes took place to cor- 
rect  the deficiencies in the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System to develop 
it into its present form. The rate of occurring problems was very high from mid-1965 
to late 1966. Means used to evaluate and close this large number of problems included 
handwritten tracking logs, daily telephone conferences between cognizant NASA and con- 
tractor personnel, and formation of special task teams to work on critical problems. 
The fact that such a large number of problems were closed is an achievement worthy 
of note. Features of the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System used in the 
Apollo Program a r e  applicable to future manned spacecraft, but ca re  should be exer- 
cised to adapt the system to the different requirements. 
RECOMMENDATI ONS 
One recommendation for  the design of the Problem Reporting and Corrective 
Action System for future programs is to change the philosophy of requiring that every 
open problem be resolved before flight. For priority of work purposes, it may be pos- 
sible to categorize the problems by the criticality of the equipment involved and u s e  the 
Apollo explain technique. On less critical equipment, problem analysis related to actual 
teardown of hardware may be dictated by trends of occurrence rather than by analysis 
of each problem as i t  occurs. 
(I 
Another possibility is the establishment of a problem analysis facility at the launch 
site. In the Apollo Program, most of the failed hardware was returned to the vendor for 
failure analysis, with attendant delays in shipping and in ensuring that an adequate analy- 
sis was performed by the vendor. This may not be feasible on future programs. 
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There a r e  possible applications of the Apollo spacecraft Problem Reporting and 
Corrective Action System to future manned programs other than those outlined. Many 
of the Apollo guidelines can be applied to ensure that the hardware launched as a par t  
of the United States space program is adequate fo r  mission performance. 
I Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, November 5, 1973 
951-1 8-00- 00-72 
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APPENDIX 
DEFl N IT1 ONS 
Words o r  terms used in this report that have a special connotation o r  meaning a r e  
listed below. 
Nonconformance: Nonconformance is a condition of any article, material, o r  
service in which one o r  more characteristics do not conform to requirements. This 
includes failures, unsatisfactory conditions, discrepancies, deficiencies, defects, and 
malfunctions. 
Problem: A problem is any nonconformance that fits, or  is suspected of fitting, 
into one of the following categories: (1) failure o r  unsatisfactory condition occurring 
during or  after production acceptance testing or  (2) failure o r  unsatisfactory condition 
occurring before acceptance testing that will or  has the potential to affect safety ad- 
versely, contribute to schedule impact, cause a launch delay, or result in design change. 
Failure: Failure is the inability of a system, subsystem, component, o r  par t  to 
perform its required function within specified l imits under specified conditions for a 
specified duration. 
Unsatisfactory condition: An unsatisfactory condition is any defect for which en- 
gineering disposition is required and which requires  recurrence control beyond the 
specific article under consideration. Included in this definition a r e  conditions that can- 
not be corrected to the specified configuration using the standard planned operations o r  
events that could lead to a failed condition but do not affect the function of the article, 
such as contamination, corrosion, workmanship requiring engineering disposition, and 
so  forth. 
Open problem: An open problem is a problem f o r  which responsible MSC manage- 
ment personnel have not approved the problem resolution submitted by the hardware 
supplier. A problem is deemed to be open until the hardware supplier is formally 
notified by MSC that resolutions a r e  acceptable for all deliverable end-items to which 
the problem is applicable. 
Resolved problem: A resolved problem is a problem that has  been closed or 
explained. 
Routine problem: A routine problem is a problem that has no potential to affect 
the program adversely. 
Closed problem: A problem is closed when the hardware supplier is formally 
notified of MSC concurrence with the problem analysis (including determination of the 
cause) and with the implementation of corrective action to preclude recurrence of the 
problem on hardware after acceptance tests.  A lack of corrective action may be ac- 
ceptable to MSC if analytical and test  evidence from the hardware supplier shows that 
the problem is always detectable during the performance of an established test before 
end use, and that the problem will not occur after this test. 
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I Explained problem: A problem is explained when the hardware supplier is for- 
mally notified of MSC concurrence with the problem analysis and rationale for not es-  
tablishing corrective action. The rationale must establish that a planned mission may 
proceed with no detrimental effects should the problem recur  and that a MSC contrac- 
tually responsible authority (that is, the Configuration Control Board) has decided that 
no corrective action, as defined for a closed problem, need be established. 
t 
Problem analysis: A problem analysis is documented results of the investigation 
performed to determine the cause of the problem. 
Cause (problem cause): The cause or problem cause is the event or  se r ies  of 
events directly responsible for the problem. 
Corrective action: Corrective action is action established to prevent recurrence 
of the problem. 
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